Three plausible conditions in 2031 and 2036, built from Libya's own recorded
history. Not a prediction — a stated set of assumptions you can check, disagree with, and recompute.
New here? This is one of 54 country briefs on Africa 2036 Intelligence, an
evidence-based foresight instrument. Values marked with a year are measurements; values attached to a
scenario are projections computed from this country's own history. Where a value is missing it is shown
as missing, never estimated.
COMESAAMU/UMAEvidence: ModerateInitial country review
How much weight this outlook bears
The evidence supports a broad direction of travel but not fine distinctions between outcomes.
Core indicator series are close to complete.
Most recent observation is from 2025 — current.
Growth has been highly volatile (sd 31.04); any central path should be treated with caution.
Country-specific policy and project evidence has been reviewed and cited.
Why this matters
The same seven questions are asked of all 54 countries, and every answer below is
computed from Libya's own evidence and model state — nothing here is written by hand, so
nothing here can drift away from the data it rests on.
7 of 7 questions can be answered from the evidence held for Libya.
What could materially change by 2031
Conditional projection
Internet use moves from 82% of the population (2024) to between 90% and 95% by 2031, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 93% — a rise of 10.8 percentage points.
In people rather than percentages: about 573,776 would still be without it in 2031 under continuation — 772,158 fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
Output per person spans $4,449 to $10,815 by 2031. The $6,366 between them is wider than half today's $6,449.
That spread is the distance between scenarios, not a margin of error — and it is a national average, which does not identify whose income moved.
The population reaches about 8 million — roughly 510,554 more people than in 2025, about 5.5 million of them of working age.
This figure is the same in all three scenarios. Most of the people who will be alive in 2031 have already been born.
What could materially change by 2036
Conditional projection
Household electricity access moves from 77.4% of the population (2024) to between 79% and 81% by 2036, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 80% — a rise of 2.1 percentage points.
In people rather than percentages: about 1.7 million would still be without it in 2036 under continuation — 27,651 more than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
Internet use moves from 82% of the population (2024) to between 93% and 97% by 2036, depending on the scenario. Simple continuation gives 96% — a rise of 13.7 percentage points.
In people rather than percentages: about 359,372 would still be without it in 2036 under continuation — 986,562 fewer than in 2024, because the population grows as the share improves.
Output per person spans $3,265 to $16,641 by 2036. The $13,376 between them is wider than half today's $6,449.
That spread is the distance between scenarios, not a margin of error — and it is a national average, which does not identify whose income moved.
The population reaches about 8.4 million — roughly 898,931 more people than in 2025, about 5.8 million of them of working age.
This figure is the same in all three scenarios. Most of the people who will be alive in 2036 have already been born.
Who may benefit
Interpretation
Women entering paid work, and the households whose income rises with them
The public finances, when prices are high
Small firms and independent workers able to reach customers beyond their street
the 67% of people aged 15 and over with neither a bank nor a mobile-money account in 2024, if payment access widens before the projected connectivity does
rural households carrying a 77-point electricity gap, who have the most to gain from any of it closing
Who may be excluded
Interpretation
Educated young people whose qualifications do not convert into work
Everyone dependent on public salaries and services when prices fall
Households already spending most of their income on food
Firms whose expansion depends on credit, in an economy holding little of it relative to output
Civilians in contested areas, for whom no economic scenario on this page is the operative question
Irrigating farmers and cities drawing on the same stressed sources
rural households, 77 points behind on electricity in 2012 — a gap that closes last in every scenario here because access improves fastest where it is already highest
young people already outside work at 50.1% in 2025, in a labour market the projections grow but do not restructure
What must happen for this to be plausible
From the evidence
For the Acceleration band to describe the decade, growth per person has to hold near 9% a year. This country has reached that rate before — its best year in the window was 89.4% — but has not sustained it across the 15-year record the band is drawn from.
What could invalidate this outlook
Interpretation
Political instability & conflict — Onset or escalation of armed conflict. The modelled band is drawn from economic history and contains no war; if this occurs, disregard the quantitative path entirely.
Commodity dependence — A sustained move in the country's principal export price of more than roughly a third. The band averages across a cycle and understates both tails.
Institutional capacity & regulatory reform — A change of government that materially alters delivery capacity, in either direction.
Climate exposure & disaster risk — A multi-season drought or a major flood event affecting the main producing regions. Discrete climate events are outside any band built from recent averages.
Food & water systems — A regional harvest failure, or a change in the affordability of food imports.
What to watch now
From the evidence
Real GDP per capita growth sustained above 9% for three consecutive years → The Acceleration band would be the better description of the decade.
Real GDP per capita growth below -6% for two consecutive years → The Disruption band would be the better description of the decade.
Electricity access above 79.2% by 2031 (momentum path reaches 78.6%) → Energy access is running ahead of the momentum path.
1 recorded item here rests on a source this platform has not confirmed against the issuing institution. Confirmation or contradiction of it would change what can be said.
Political instability & conflict, Commodity dependence and Institutional capacity & regulatory reform are assessed as binding here. Movement on them would change the outlook faster than movement inside the growth band.
This country's review covers 2 of the five target evidence areas. Treat the outlook as a floor for what could be said about it, not a ceiling.
The three futures
The assumption, stated in full
Annual real GDP growth minus annual population growth, 2011–2025 (15 years). Mean 1.64%, standard deviation 31.04. Scenario rates are mean ± 0.85 sd, clamped to this country's own 5th–95th percentile and to [-6%, +9%].
Momentum — 1.64% a year
Present trajectories broadly continue.
Policy, investment, institutions and demographics carry on behaving as they have. No collapse, no breakthrough. This is not a forecast of what will happen — it is the shape of the recent past extended forward, which is the baseline every other scenario should be judged against.
The recent past, extended. The question it asks is whether that is enough.
For Libya this is 1.64% a year per person,
drawn from its own 15-year record (2011–2025),
not from an outside view of what this country might do.
What it is good at
Predictability. Institutions, tariffs, procurement and delivery capacity behave as they already do, so plans made today mostly survive contact with the decade. Existing programmes finish. Nothing has to be rebuilt.
What it costs
Everything that is currently too slow stays too slow. Where a gap is closing at two points a year and the population is growing at three percent, continuation means the absolute number of people excluded rises even as the percentage falls.
Who it reaches last
Whoever is already last. Continuation preserves the existing sequence of who gets connected, treated, schooled and paid — it does not reorder it.
What it quietly assumes
That the conditions of the last fifteen years hold for the next ten: no default, no major conflict, no discrete climate event, and no external shock large enough to break the trend the band is drawn from.
How it is usually misread
Momentum is routinely read as the safe or neutral case. It is neither. It is the case in which nothing is done differently, and for several countries on this platform that is the most consequential choice available.
Measure
2026
2031
2036
Population (same in all scenarios)
7.5m
8m
8.4m
Working-age population (15–64) (same in all scenarios)
5.2m
5.5m
5.8m
Real GDP per capita
$6,555
$7,110
$7,712
Electricity access
77.8%
78.6%
79.5%
Internet use
86.4%
92.8%
95.7%
Acceleration — 9% a year
The country sustains the pace of its own better years.
Reform, investment, regional trade, energy build-out, education and institutional capacity perform above the recent average — at a rate this country has actually reached before, held for a decade rather than a year or two.
Not a miracle — this country's own good years, held for a decade instead of a season.
For Libya this is 9% a year per person,
drawn from its own 15-year record (2011–2025),
not from an outside view of what this country might do.
What it is good at
Compounding. A rate held for ten years does something a rate held for two cannot: it changes the level, not just the direction. Access gaps close inside the horizon rather than beyond it, and the working-age bulge arrives into an economy that has grown to meet it.
What it costs
Speed is unevenly distributed by default. Growth concentrates where infrastructure, credit and skills already are, which in most of these economies means the largest city and the formal sector. Faster national numbers can coexist with a widening internal gap, and this platform cannot see that gap because the indicators behind it are national.
Who it reaches last
Rural, informal and non-connected populations, unless something specific is done to reach them. Acceleration reaches them faster in absolute terms and no sooner in sequence.
What it quietly assumes
Sustained implementation capacity — the same institutions delivering at their best, continuously, for a decade. It is the strongest assumption on this platform, and the historical record for holding a peak rate that long is thin everywhere, not only here.
How it is usually misread
Acceleration is routinely read as the target. It is a description of a pace, not of a distribution, and it says nothing about who the growth reaches.
Measure
2026
2031
2036
Population (same in all scenarios)
7.5m
8m
8.4m
Working-age population (15–64) (same in all scenarios)
5.2m
5.5m
5.8m
Real GDP per capita
$7,029
$10,815
$16,641
Electricity access
77.9%
79.2%
80.5%
Internet use
88.1%
95%
97.1%
Disruption — -6% a year
The country runs at the pace of its own worse years.
Debt service, weak implementation, instability, climate shocks, capital flight or external shocks hold performance at the low end of realised experience. Note the limit: this band is drawn from recent history, so it does not represent a war, a default or a catastrophic climate event. Those are listed as named risks instead of being given a false number.
Not collapse. The low end of what this country has already survived — which is the point.
For Libya this is -6% a year per person,
drawn from its own 15-year record (2011–2025),
not from an outside view of what this country might do.
What it is good at
Clarity about what is load-bearing. The commitments that survive a bad decade are the ones with financing already closed and construction already started; everything at announcement stage is what disappears first. Disruption is the scenario that separates the two.
What it costs
Time. Gaps that would close inside the horizon move outside it, and a cohort passes through school, into work and into household formation while the conditions do not improve. That cost is paid by specific ages of specific people and is not recoverable later.
Who it reaches last
Nobody new is reached. The people this scenario hits first are those with the least buffer — households already spending most of their income on food, workers in rain-fed agriculture, and anyone whose access depends on a service that gets cut before it gets extended.
What it quietly assumes
That the bad years look like the bad years already in the record. It does NOT model war, sovereign default or a catastrophic climate event — those are outside any band built from realised history, and this platform names them as risks instead of giving them a number it cannot support.
How it is usually misread
Disruption is routinely read as the collapse case. It is the opposite: it is bounded by what has already happened, which makes it the most conservative of the three about how bad things could get.
Measure
2026
2031
2036
Population (same in all scenarios)
7.5m
8m
8.4m
Working-age population (15–64) (same in all scenarios)
5.2m
5.5m
5.8m
Real GDP per capita
$6,062
$4,449
$3,265
Electricity access
77.6%
78.2%
78.8%
Internet use
85%
90.3%
93.4%
GDP per capita paths are expressed in constant present-day dollars — a real-output path, not a forecast
of prices or exchange rates. Population comes from the UN World Population Prospects and is carried
through unchanged, which is why it does not vary between scenarios: ten-year demographic momentum is
close to fixed.
Early signals
Thresholds derived from the model itself. You can check which band reality is tracking without waiting for us to tell you.
Real GDP per capita growth sustained above 9% for three consecutive years
The Acceleration band would be the better description of the decade.
Real GDP per capita growth below -6% for two consecutive years
The Disruption band would be the better description of the decade.
Electricity access above 79.2% by 2031 (momentum path reaches 78.6%)
Energy access is running ahead of the momentum path.
Internet use above 95% by 2031 (momentum path reaches 92.8%)
Digital foundations are running ahead of the momentum path.
Lived experience
What the projected numbers would mean for ten representative situations. Not predictions, and not stories about real people.
Momentum · 2036
What the projected numbers would mean, taken together, for ten representative situations under
Momentum in 2036.
These are not predictions and not stories about real people. Each one states the evidence it rests
on, the assumptions it makes, and who the improvement would miss.
A young person entering the workforce
Roughly 637,924 more people reach working age between 2026 and 2036. They enter a labour market where 50.1% of 15–24s were already counted as unemployed in 2025, and where 10% of all work is in agriculture (2025). Under Momentum, internet use moves from 82% to 96% — a materially larger share of this cohort can reach work, training and customers beyond walking distance. With tertiary enrolment at 58.5%, a meaningful minority arrives with formal qualifications; whether those convert into work is the open question.
Better if
Technical training is aligned to what employers actually hire for, and the evidence on which courses lead to work is published.
Worse if
The cohort arrives faster than jobs, training places or electricity, in which case a demographic dividend becomes a grievance.
Who this misses
Young people outside the main urban labour markets, for whom the national average conceals a much thinner set of options.
Assumptions and evidence
Working-age population follows the UN World Population Prospects projection, unchanged.
Youth unemployment is an ILO modelled estimate and understates underemployment in largely informal labour markets.
Connectivity gains are assumed to reach young people at least as fast as the population average — historically optimistic.
Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025Youth unemployment, 15–24 (ILO modelled) 50.1% · 2025School enrolment, tertiary (gross) 58.5% · 2003Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024
A small-business owner
Electricity access moves from 77% of the population (2024) to 80% by 2036 under Momentum. That measures connections, not hours of supply: a workshop counted as served may still be waiting on power for part of the day, and this platform holds no outage or tariff data for it. Domestic credit to the private sector stood at 12.5% of GDP in 2025, which is thin by any comparison. Plausible implication, not measured: a credit-to-GDP ratio this low is consistent with borrowing being hard for small firms, but the ratio is an aggregate and cannot show which firms were refused or why. A firm-level credit survey would establish it. 33% of people aged 15 and over held an account at a bank or other financial institution, or personally used a mobile-money service, in 2024. Mobile money is counted. Plausible implication, not measured: account records are the kind of evidence a lender can price risk against, so widening ownership could open borrowing to traders without land title. Nothing in this platform measures whether that has happened here — lender practice, or credit-bureau coverage, would show it. Average output per person in the surrounding market moves from $6,449 to $7,712 a year. That is a national mean and does not identify whose income changed.
Better if
Collateral registries, insolvency procedure and payment rails are fixed before credit is subsidised.
Worse if
Credit is expanded into a weak enforcement system, producing bad loans rather than businesses.
Who this misses
Unregistered traders, who are the majority of businesses in most of these economies and are invisible to both the credit statistics and the policies built on them.
Assumptions and evidence
GDP per capita is expressed in constant present-day dollars and describes average output, not the income of any particular household.
Electricity access measures connection, not hours of supply or price. A connected business with eight-hour outages is counted as served.
Domestic credit to the private sector is a stock ratio. It does not distinguish lending to large firms from lending to small ones, and most of the businesses this situation describes are unregistered and outside it entirely.
Access to electricity 77.4% · 2024Domestic credit to private sector 12.5% · 2025Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024GDP per capita $6,449 · 2025
A farmer or food producer
10% of the country's workers were in agriculture in 2025. Cereal yields averaged 660 kg per hectare — well below what the same seed achieves with reliable inputs, water and storage, so the largest available productivity gain is not a new technology but the ordinary one already used elsewhere. By 2036, 80% of the population has electricity under Momentum — the precondition for irrigation pumps, cold storage and anything that stops a harvest rotting between field and market. 96% internet use puts price information, weather and pest identification within reach of a phone, for those who have one and can afford data. Water withdrawals already run at 817% of renewable resources (2022), so irrigation expands into competition with cities and power generation, not into spare capacity. Undernourishment affected 16.5% of people in 2023: food exists in the region and cannot affordably be moved, which is a roads and storage problem more than a farming one.
Better if
Investment goes into what happens after harvest — storage, roads, cold chain, market information — not only into what happens before it.
Worse if
A multi-season drought arrives, which no band on this platform models, or input costs rise faster than farmgate prices.
Who this misses
Rain-fed smallholders without irrigation, who feel a bad season first and hardest, and women farmers, who in most of these countries hold weaker land tenure and less access to credit.
Assumptions and evidence
National electricity and connectivity projections are applied to a rural situation, though rural access consistently lags the national figure.
Yield gaps are treated as closeable with existing technology; that assumes input supply, credit and extension services that may not exist.
Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025Cereal yield 660 kg/ha · 2024Prevalence of undernourishment 16.5% · 2023Freshwater withdrawal as share of available resources 817.1% · 2022
A healthcare worker, and a patient
There were 20.4 physicians per 10,000 people in 2017. The population they serve grows by 817,635 between 2026 and 2036, so holding the current ratio requires training and retaining staff at that rate merely to stand still. Electricity reaching 80% by 2036 under Momentum is what makes a vaccine cold chain, a functioning theatre and a night-time delivery possible outside the largest towns. Out-of-pocket payments were 19% of health spending in 2023. Under-five mortality stood at 9.8 per 1,000 live births (2024).
Better if
Health financing moves toward pooled, prepaid arrangements, and task-shifting is supported by law rather than tolerated informally.
Worse if
Trained clinicians emigrate faster than they are replaced, or external health financing contracts.
Who this misses
People in rural districts and informal settlements, where the physician ratio is a fraction of the national figure, and anyone whose care is rationed by ability to pay at the point of service.
Assumptions and evidence
Workforce density is a national average; it conceals extreme concentration in capital cities.
This platform holds no projection for health workforce or financing — only the current position against a projected population.
Physicians per 1,000 people 2.04 / 1,000 · 2017Out-of-pocket health expenditure 19.2% · 2023Under-5 mortality rate 9.8 / 1,000 · 2024
A teacher, and a student
The school-age population grows with a national population rising by 817,635 to 2036. Gross secondary enrolment was 97.6% in 2006 and tertiary 58.5%. Government spent 2.3% of GDP on education in 1999. Under Momentum, 80% of households have electricity by 2036 — which is when homework after dark stops being a privilege. 96% internet use makes digital material reachable for that share of students, and no more; 4% of the population remains outside it.
Better if
Electricity and connectivity reach schools ahead of the national average rather than behind it, and teacher supply grows with enrolment.
Worse if
Enrolment expands faster than teachers are trained, converting access gains into larger classes and weaker learning.
Who this misses
Girls in regions where secondary completion diverges sharply by gender, and children in households where the opportunity cost of school attendance is immediate income.
Assumptions and evidence
Gross enrolment ratios can exceed 100% and include students outside the standard age range; they measure participation, not learning.
This platform holds no measure of learning outcomes, teacher supply or classroom quality — a substantial gap in describing education.
School enrolment, secondary (gross) 97.6% · 2006School enrolment, tertiary (gross) 58.5% · 2003Government expenditure on education 2.3% · 1999
A creative entrepreneur
By 2036 under Momentum, roughly 8 million people in this country are online — the domestic audience reachable without leaving it. That is up from about 82% of the population in 2024 to 96%. 33% of people aged 15 and over held a bank or mobile-money account in 2024, so being paid directly by that audience is mechanically possible for a minority of it. Production still depends on power: 80% household electricity access by 2036 sets how far studios, editing and streaming can spread beyond the main city.
Better if
Payment rails work across borders and royalties are collected and enforced domestically rather than captured offshore.
Worse if
Data costs stay high relative to income, or distribution platforms owned elsewhere capture the value created here.
Who this misses
Creators working in languages the major platforms do not support well, and anyone without a device capable of running current tools.
Assumptions and evidence
Domestic reach is calculated as projected internet use multiplied by projected population. It counts people who can technically be reached, not an audience.
This platform holds no reviewed creative-sector evidence for this country. Reach and payment access are stand-ins for a sector nobody has measured here.
Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025
A trader using regional markets
Trade was 138% of GDP in 2025, so what happens at a neighbour's border arrives as a domestic price within months. This country sits inside COMESA, AMU/UMA. AfCFTA has been signed by every African Union member state except Eritrea, but tariff schedules, rules of origin and customs practice — not the treaty — decide whether a small consignment moves more cheaply in 2036 than it does today. 33% of people aged 15 and over held a bank or mobile-money account in 2024 — the share able to settle across a border without carrying cash.
Better if
Rules of origin are agreed on contested product lines and applied at national customs, not just gazetted.
Worse if
Regional blocs fragment further, or preferential tariffs remain unimplemented at the border despite ratification.
Who this misses
Small cross-border traders, disproportionately women, who operate below the threshold at which formal preferential regimes are usable at all.
Assumptions and evidence
Trade openness is a national accounts ratio and says nothing about the cost or time of a specific border crossing.
This platform holds no country-level data on intra-African trade share, non-tariff barriers or border clearance times — the measures that would matter most here.
Trade (exports + imports) 137.7% · 2025Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024
A family in a growing city
Urban population was growing 1.1% a year in 2025, doubling roughly every 65 years. On the projected population, of the order of 718,793 additional people are living in this country's towns and cities by 2036. 17% of urban residents were in informal settlements in 2022 — housing built faster than it was serviced. Under Momentum, 80% of the population has electricity by 2036. The decisions that determine whether this family's commute is one hour or three — where roads, water mains and drainage go, and which land is reserved before it is built on — are being made now, and are expensive to reverse afterwards.
Better if
Land for roads, water mains and drainage is bought and reserved before settlement arrives — the cheapest infrastructure decision available and the one most often skipped.
Worse if
Growth outpaces servicing, in which case today's new neighbourhoods become the next decade's retrofit problem at many times the cost.
Who this misses
Renters and residents without secure tenure, who bear eviction risk and are usually the first displaced when upgrading finally arrives.
Assumptions and evidence
Urban share is held constant when estimating additional urban residents; in practice it is rising, so this is a conservative figure.
This platform holds no city-level data. National averages conceal very large differences between a capital and a secondary town.
Urban population 87.9% · 2025Urban population growth 1.1% · 2025Population living in slums 16.6% · 2022
A citizen dealing with government
Government effectiveness scored -1.4 in 2024 on a scale running roughly −2.5 to +2.5. With 96% internet use by 2036 under Momentum, permits, payments, registrations and records can plausibly be handled without a physical queue for that share of the population — the most tangible improvement most citizens would actually notice. Voice and accountability scored -1.3 (2024). The same identity systems, registries and monitoring capability that shorten a queue are also what surveillance is built from, and the measures that would constrain misuse currently score in the lower band. Both outcomes are live and depend on choices not yet made.
Better if
Digital public infrastructure is built with data protection law, independent oversight and offline fallbacks from the start.
Worse if
Identity and payment systems become a precondition for services before coverage is universal, excluding people from entitlements they already hold.
Who this misses
People without formal identity documents, who are disproportionately rural, poor, migrant or stateless — and who are excluded twice when services move online.
Assumptions and evidence
Governance indicators are perception-based composites. They signal direction and relative position, not measured administrative performance.
Connectivity is assumed to be usable for government services; in practice affordability, literacy and identity documentation each gate access again.
Government effectiveness -1.42 · 2024Voice and accountability -1.34 · 2024
A member of the diaspora weighing return or investment
Remittances were 0% of GDP in 2006, against foreign direct investment at 1.8% — meaning money sent home by citizens abroad is a significant and unusually reliable external flow. Under Momentum, real output per person moves from $6,449 (2025) to $7,712 by 2036, about 1.6% a year. By 2036, 80% electricity access and 96% internet use set what can actually be operated on the ground. Rule of law scored -1.7 (2024), which is the measure that most often decides whether a diaspora investor commits capital rather than only sending support.
Better if
Property registration, repatriation of profits and dispute resolution are made predictable — the three things that convert diaspora sentiment into diaspora capital.
Worse if
Currency controls or an unpredictable tax treatment of returning residents make commitment more expensive than continued remittance.
Who this misses
Diaspora members without capital to invest, whose contribution is already the largest single external flow and who are rarely the audience for investment policy.
Assumptions and evidence
GDP per capita paths are in constant present-day dollars and assume no exchange-rate or price forecast.
Remittance ratios are balance-of-payments estimates and exclude informal channels, which are substantial in most of these countries.
Personal remittances received 0% · 2006Foreign direct investment, net inflows 1.8% · 2023GDP per capita $6,449 · 2025Rule of law -1.7 · 2024
Acceleration · 2036
What the projected numbers would mean, taken together, for ten representative situations under
Acceleration in 2036.
These are not predictions and not stories about real people. Each one states the evidence it rests
on, the assumptions it makes, and who the improvement would miss.
A young person entering the workforce
Roughly 637,924 more people reach working age between 2026 and 2036. They enter a labour market where 50.1% of 15–24s were already counted as unemployed in 2025, and where 10% of all work is in agriculture (2025). Under Acceleration, internet use moves from 82% to 97% — a materially larger share of this cohort can reach work, training and customers beyond walking distance. With tertiary enrolment at 58.5%, a meaningful minority arrives with formal qualifications; whether those convert into work is the open question.
Better if
Technical training is aligned to what employers actually hire for, and the evidence on which courses lead to work is published.
Worse if
The cohort arrives faster than jobs, training places or electricity, in which case a demographic dividend becomes a grievance.
Who this misses
Young people outside the main urban labour markets, for whom the national average conceals a much thinner set of options.
Assumptions and evidence
Working-age population follows the UN World Population Prospects projection, unchanged.
Youth unemployment is an ILO modelled estimate and understates underemployment in largely informal labour markets.
Connectivity gains are assumed to reach young people at least as fast as the population average — historically optimistic.
Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025Youth unemployment, 15–24 (ILO modelled) 50.1% · 2025School enrolment, tertiary (gross) 58.5% · 2003Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024
A small-business owner
Electricity access moves from 77% of the population (2024) to 81% by 2036 under Acceleration. That measures connections, not hours of supply: a workshop counted as served may still be waiting on power for part of the day, and this platform holds no outage or tariff data for it. Domestic credit to the private sector stood at 12.5% of GDP in 2025, which is thin by any comparison. Plausible implication, not measured: a credit-to-GDP ratio this low is consistent with borrowing being hard for small firms, but the ratio is an aggregate and cannot show which firms were refused or why. A firm-level credit survey would establish it. 33% of people aged 15 and over held an account at a bank or other financial institution, or personally used a mobile-money service, in 2024. Mobile money is counted. Plausible implication, not measured: account records are the kind of evidence a lender can price risk against, so widening ownership could open borrowing to traders without land title. Nothing in this platform measures whether that has happened here — lender practice, or credit-bureau coverage, would show it. Average output per person in the surrounding market moves from $6,449 to $16,641 a year. That is a national mean and does not identify whose income changed.
Better if
Collateral registries, insolvency procedure and payment rails are fixed before credit is subsidised.
Worse if
Credit is expanded into a weak enforcement system, producing bad loans rather than businesses.
Who this misses
Unregistered traders, who are the majority of businesses in most of these economies and are invisible to both the credit statistics and the policies built on them.
Assumptions and evidence
GDP per capita is expressed in constant present-day dollars and describes average output, not the income of any particular household.
Electricity access measures connection, not hours of supply or price. A connected business with eight-hour outages is counted as served.
Domestic credit to the private sector is a stock ratio. It does not distinguish lending to large firms from lending to small ones, and most of the businesses this situation describes are unregistered and outside it entirely.
Access to electricity 77.4% · 2024Domestic credit to private sector 12.5% · 2025Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024GDP per capita $6,449 · 2025
A farmer or food producer
10% of the country's workers were in agriculture in 2025. Cereal yields averaged 660 kg per hectare — well below what the same seed achieves with reliable inputs, water and storage, so the largest available productivity gain is not a new technology but the ordinary one already used elsewhere. By 2036, 81% of the population has electricity under Acceleration — the precondition for irrigation pumps, cold storage and anything that stops a harvest rotting between field and market. 97% internet use puts price information, weather and pest identification within reach of a phone, for those who have one and can afford data. Water withdrawals already run at 817% of renewable resources (2022), so irrigation expands into competition with cities and power generation, not into spare capacity. Undernourishment affected 16.5% of people in 2023: food exists in the region and cannot affordably be moved, which is a roads and storage problem more than a farming one.
Better if
Investment goes into what happens after harvest — storage, roads, cold chain, market information — not only into what happens before it.
Worse if
A multi-season drought arrives, which no band on this platform models, or input costs rise faster than farmgate prices.
Who this misses
Rain-fed smallholders without irrigation, who feel a bad season first and hardest, and women farmers, who in most of these countries hold weaker land tenure and less access to credit.
Assumptions and evidence
National electricity and connectivity projections are applied to a rural situation, though rural access consistently lags the national figure.
Yield gaps are treated as closeable with existing technology; that assumes input supply, credit and extension services that may not exist.
Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025Cereal yield 660 kg/ha · 2024Prevalence of undernourishment 16.5% · 2023Freshwater withdrawal as share of available resources 817.1% · 2022
A healthcare worker, and a patient
There were 20.4 physicians per 10,000 people in 2017. The population they serve grows by 817,635 between 2026 and 2036, so holding the current ratio requires training and retaining staff at that rate merely to stand still. Electricity reaching 81% by 2036 under Acceleration is what makes a vaccine cold chain, a functioning theatre and a night-time delivery possible outside the largest towns. Out-of-pocket payments were 19% of health spending in 2023. Under-five mortality stood at 9.8 per 1,000 live births (2024).
Better if
Health financing moves toward pooled, prepaid arrangements, and task-shifting is supported by law rather than tolerated informally.
Worse if
Trained clinicians emigrate faster than they are replaced, or external health financing contracts.
Who this misses
People in rural districts and informal settlements, where the physician ratio is a fraction of the national figure, and anyone whose care is rationed by ability to pay at the point of service.
Assumptions and evidence
Workforce density is a national average; it conceals extreme concentration in capital cities.
This platform holds no projection for health workforce or financing — only the current position against a projected population.
Physicians per 1,000 people 2.04 / 1,000 · 2017Out-of-pocket health expenditure 19.2% · 2023Under-5 mortality rate 9.8 / 1,000 · 2024
A teacher, and a student
The school-age population grows with a national population rising by 817,635 to 2036. Gross secondary enrolment was 97.6% in 2006 and tertiary 58.5%. Government spent 2.3% of GDP on education in 1999. Under Acceleration, 81% of households have electricity by 2036 — which is when homework after dark stops being a privilege. 97% internet use makes digital material reachable for that share of students, and no more; 3% of the population remains outside it.
Better if
Electricity and connectivity reach schools ahead of the national average rather than behind it, and teacher supply grows with enrolment.
Worse if
Enrolment expands faster than teachers are trained, converting access gains into larger classes and weaker learning.
Who this misses
Girls in regions where secondary completion diverges sharply by gender, and children in households where the opportunity cost of school attendance is immediate income.
Assumptions and evidence
Gross enrolment ratios can exceed 100% and include students outside the standard age range; they measure participation, not learning.
This platform holds no measure of learning outcomes, teacher supply or classroom quality — a substantial gap in describing education.
School enrolment, secondary (gross) 97.6% · 2006School enrolment, tertiary (gross) 58.5% · 2003Government expenditure on education 2.3% · 1999
A creative entrepreneur
By 2036 under Acceleration, roughly 8.1 million people in this country are online — the domestic audience reachable without leaving it. That is up from about 82% of the population in 2024 to 97%. 33% of people aged 15 and over held a bank or mobile-money account in 2024, so being paid directly by that audience is mechanically possible for a minority of it. Production still depends on power: 81% household electricity access by 2036 sets how far studios, editing and streaming can spread beyond the main city.
Better if
Payment rails work across borders and royalties are collected and enforced domestically rather than captured offshore.
Worse if
Data costs stay high relative to income, or distribution platforms owned elsewhere capture the value created here.
Who this misses
Creators working in languages the major platforms do not support well, and anyone without a device capable of running current tools.
Assumptions and evidence
Domestic reach is calculated as projected internet use multiplied by projected population. It counts people who can technically be reached, not an audience.
This platform holds no reviewed creative-sector evidence for this country. Reach and payment access are stand-ins for a sector nobody has measured here.
Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025
A trader using regional markets
Trade was 138% of GDP in 2025, so what happens at a neighbour's border arrives as a domestic price within months. This country sits inside COMESA, AMU/UMA. AfCFTA has been signed by every African Union member state except Eritrea, but tariff schedules, rules of origin and customs practice — not the treaty — decide whether a small consignment moves more cheaply in 2036 than it does today. 33% of people aged 15 and over held a bank or mobile-money account in 2024 — the share able to settle across a border without carrying cash.
Better if
Rules of origin are agreed on contested product lines and applied at national customs, not just gazetted.
Worse if
Regional blocs fragment further, or preferential tariffs remain unimplemented at the border despite ratification.
Who this misses
Small cross-border traders, disproportionately women, who operate below the threshold at which formal preferential regimes are usable at all.
Assumptions and evidence
Trade openness is a national accounts ratio and says nothing about the cost or time of a specific border crossing.
This platform holds no country-level data on intra-African trade share, non-tariff barriers or border clearance times — the measures that would matter most here.
Trade (exports + imports) 137.7% · 2025Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024
A family in a growing city
Urban population was growing 1.1% a year in 2025, doubling roughly every 65 years. On the projected population, of the order of 718,793 additional people are living in this country's towns and cities by 2036. 17% of urban residents were in informal settlements in 2022 — housing built faster than it was serviced. Under Acceleration, 81% of the population has electricity by 2036. The decisions that determine whether this family's commute is one hour or three — where roads, water mains and drainage go, and which land is reserved before it is built on — are being made now, and are expensive to reverse afterwards.
Better if
Land for roads, water mains and drainage is bought and reserved before settlement arrives — the cheapest infrastructure decision available and the one most often skipped.
Worse if
Growth outpaces servicing, in which case today's new neighbourhoods become the next decade's retrofit problem at many times the cost.
Who this misses
Renters and residents without secure tenure, who bear eviction risk and are usually the first displaced when upgrading finally arrives.
Assumptions and evidence
Urban share is held constant when estimating additional urban residents; in practice it is rising, so this is a conservative figure.
This platform holds no city-level data. National averages conceal very large differences between a capital and a secondary town.
Urban population 87.9% · 2025Urban population growth 1.1% · 2025Population living in slums 16.6% · 2022
A citizen dealing with government
Government effectiveness scored -1.4 in 2024 on a scale running roughly −2.5 to +2.5. With 97% internet use by 2036 under Acceleration, permits, payments, registrations and records can plausibly be handled without a physical queue for that share of the population — the most tangible improvement most citizens would actually notice. Voice and accountability scored -1.3 (2024). The same identity systems, registries and monitoring capability that shorten a queue are also what surveillance is built from, and the measures that would constrain misuse currently score in the lower band. Both outcomes are live and depend on choices not yet made.
Better if
Digital public infrastructure is built with data protection law, independent oversight and offline fallbacks from the start.
Worse if
Identity and payment systems become a precondition for services before coverage is universal, excluding people from entitlements they already hold.
Who this misses
People without formal identity documents, who are disproportionately rural, poor, migrant or stateless — and who are excluded twice when services move online.
Assumptions and evidence
Governance indicators are perception-based composites. They signal direction and relative position, not measured administrative performance.
Connectivity is assumed to be usable for government services; in practice affordability, literacy and identity documentation each gate access again.
Government effectiveness -1.42 · 2024Voice and accountability -1.34 · 2024
A member of the diaspora weighing return or investment
Remittances were 0% of GDP in 2006, against foreign direct investment at 1.8% — meaning money sent home by citizens abroad is a significant and unusually reliable external flow. Under Acceleration, real output per person moves from $6,449 (2025) to $16,641 by 2036, about 9% a year. By 2036, 81% electricity access and 97% internet use set what can actually be operated on the ground. Rule of law scored -1.7 (2024), which is the measure that most often decides whether a diaspora investor commits capital rather than only sending support.
Better if
Property registration, repatriation of profits and dispute resolution are made predictable — the three things that convert diaspora sentiment into diaspora capital.
Worse if
Currency controls or an unpredictable tax treatment of returning residents make commitment more expensive than continued remittance.
Who this misses
Diaspora members without capital to invest, whose contribution is already the largest single external flow and who are rarely the audience for investment policy.
Assumptions and evidence
GDP per capita paths are in constant present-day dollars and assume no exchange-rate or price forecast.
Remittance ratios are balance-of-payments estimates and exclude informal channels, which are substantial in most of these countries.
Personal remittances received 0% · 2006Foreign direct investment, net inflows 1.8% · 2023GDP per capita $6,449 · 2025Rule of law -1.7 · 2024
Disruption · 2036
What the projected numbers would mean, taken together, for ten representative situations under
Disruption in 2036.
These are not predictions and not stories about real people. Each one states the evidence it rests
on, the assumptions it makes, and who the improvement would miss.
A young person entering the workforce
Roughly 637,924 more people reach working age between 2026 and 2036. They enter a labour market where 50.1% of 15–24s were already counted as unemployed in 2025, and where 10% of all work is in agriculture (2025). Under Disruption, internet use moves from 82% to 93% — a modest widening, meaning connectivity remains a sorting mechanism rather than a leveller. With tertiary enrolment at 58.5%, a meaningful minority arrives with formal qualifications; whether those convert into work is the open question.
Better if
Technical training is aligned to what employers actually hire for, and the evidence on which courses lead to work is published.
Worse if
The cohort arrives faster than jobs, training places or electricity, in which case a demographic dividend becomes a grievance.
Who this misses
Young people outside the main urban labour markets, for whom the national average conceals a much thinner set of options.
Assumptions and evidence
Working-age population follows the UN World Population Prospects projection, unchanged.
Youth unemployment is an ILO modelled estimate and understates underemployment in largely informal labour markets.
Connectivity gains are assumed to reach young people at least as fast as the population average — historically optimistic.
Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025Youth unemployment, 15–24 (ILO modelled) 50.1% · 2025School enrolment, tertiary (gross) 58.5% · 2003Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024
A small-business owner
Electricity access moves from 77% of the population (2024) to 79% by 2036 under Disruption. That measures connections, not hours of supply: a workshop counted as served may still be waiting on power for part of the day, and this platform holds no outage or tariff data for it. Domestic credit to the private sector stood at 12.5% of GDP in 2025, which is thin by any comparison. Plausible implication, not measured: a credit-to-GDP ratio this low is consistent with borrowing being hard for small firms, but the ratio is an aggregate and cannot show which firms were refused or why. A firm-level credit survey would establish it. 33% of people aged 15 and over held an account at a bank or other financial institution, or personally used a mobile-money service, in 2024. Mobile money is counted. Plausible implication, not measured: account records are the kind of evidence a lender can price risk against, so widening ownership could open borrowing to traders without land title. Nothing in this platform measures whether that has happened here — lender practice, or credit-bureau coverage, would show it. Average output per person in the surrounding market moves from $6,449 to $3,265 a year. That is a national mean and does not identify whose income changed.
Better if
Collateral registries, insolvency procedure and payment rails are fixed before credit is subsidised.
Worse if
Credit is expanded into a weak enforcement system, producing bad loans rather than businesses.
Who this misses
Unregistered traders, who are the majority of businesses in most of these economies and are invisible to both the credit statistics and the policies built on them.
Assumptions and evidence
GDP per capita is expressed in constant present-day dollars and describes average output, not the income of any particular household.
Electricity access measures connection, not hours of supply or price. A connected business with eight-hour outages is counted as served.
Domestic credit to the private sector is a stock ratio. It does not distinguish lending to large firms from lending to small ones, and most of the businesses this situation describes are unregistered and outside it entirely.
Access to electricity 77.4% · 2024Domestic credit to private sector 12.5% · 2025Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024GDP per capita $6,449 · 2025
A farmer or food producer
10% of the country's workers were in agriculture in 2025. Cereal yields averaged 660 kg per hectare — well below what the same seed achieves with reliable inputs, water and storage, so the largest available productivity gain is not a new technology but the ordinary one already used elsewhere. By 2036, 79% of the population has electricity under Disruption — the precondition for irrigation pumps, cold storage and anything that stops a harvest rotting between field and market. 93% internet use puts price information, weather and pest identification within reach of a phone, for those who have one and can afford data. Water withdrawals already run at 817% of renewable resources (2022), so irrigation expands into competition with cities and power generation, not into spare capacity. Undernourishment affected 16.5% of people in 2023: food exists in the region and cannot affordably be moved, which is a roads and storage problem more than a farming one.
Better if
Investment goes into what happens after harvest — storage, roads, cold chain, market information — not only into what happens before it.
Worse if
A multi-season drought arrives, which no band on this platform models, or input costs rise faster than farmgate prices.
Who this misses
Rain-fed smallholders without irrigation, who feel a bad season first and hardest, and women farmers, who in most of these countries hold weaker land tenure and less access to credit.
Assumptions and evidence
National electricity and connectivity projections are applied to a rural situation, though rural access consistently lags the national figure.
Yield gaps are treated as closeable with existing technology; that assumes input supply, credit and extension services that may not exist.
Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025Cereal yield 660 kg/ha · 2024Prevalence of undernourishment 16.5% · 2023Freshwater withdrawal as share of available resources 817.1% · 2022
A healthcare worker, and a patient
There were 20.4 physicians per 10,000 people in 2017. The population they serve grows by 817,635 between 2026 and 2036, so holding the current ratio requires training and retaining staff at that rate merely to stand still. Electricity reaching 79% by 2036 under Disruption is what makes a vaccine cold chain, a functioning theatre and a night-time delivery possible outside the largest towns. Out-of-pocket payments were 19% of health spending in 2023. Under-five mortality stood at 9.8 per 1,000 live births (2024).
Better if
Health financing moves toward pooled, prepaid arrangements, and task-shifting is supported by law rather than tolerated informally.
Worse if
Trained clinicians emigrate faster than they are replaced, or external health financing contracts.
Who this misses
People in rural districts and informal settlements, where the physician ratio is a fraction of the national figure, and anyone whose care is rationed by ability to pay at the point of service.
Assumptions and evidence
Workforce density is a national average; it conceals extreme concentration in capital cities.
This platform holds no projection for health workforce or financing — only the current position against a projected population.
Physicians per 1,000 people 2.04 / 1,000 · 2017Out-of-pocket health expenditure 19.2% · 2023Under-5 mortality rate 9.8 / 1,000 · 2024
A teacher, and a student
The school-age population grows with a national population rising by 817,635 to 2036. Gross secondary enrolment was 97.6% in 2006 and tertiary 58.5%. Government spent 2.3% of GDP on education in 1999. Under Disruption, 79% of households have electricity by 2036 — which is when homework after dark stops being a privilege. 93% internet use makes digital material reachable for that share of students, and no more; 7% of the population remains outside it.
Better if
Electricity and connectivity reach schools ahead of the national average rather than behind it, and teacher supply grows with enrolment.
Worse if
Enrolment expands faster than teachers are trained, converting access gains into larger classes and weaker learning.
Who this misses
Girls in regions where secondary completion diverges sharply by gender, and children in households where the opportunity cost of school attendance is immediate income.
Assumptions and evidence
Gross enrolment ratios can exceed 100% and include students outside the standard age range; they measure participation, not learning.
This platform holds no measure of learning outcomes, teacher supply or classroom quality — a substantial gap in describing education.
School enrolment, secondary (gross) 97.6% · 2006School enrolment, tertiary (gross) 58.5% · 2003Government expenditure on education 2.3% · 1999
A creative entrepreneur
By 2036 under Disruption, roughly 7.8 million people in this country are online — the domestic audience reachable without leaving it. That is up from about 82% of the population in 2024 to 93%. 33% of people aged 15 and over held a bank or mobile-money account in 2024, so being paid directly by that audience is mechanically possible for a minority of it. Production still depends on power: 79% household electricity access by 2036 sets how far studios, editing and streaming can spread beyond the main city.
Better if
Payment rails work across borders and royalties are collected and enforced domestically rather than captured offshore.
Worse if
Data costs stay high relative to income, or distribution platforms owned elsewhere capture the value created here.
Who this misses
Creators working in languages the major platforms do not support well, and anyone without a device capable of running current tools.
Assumptions and evidence
Domestic reach is calculated as projected internet use multiplied by projected population. It counts people who can technically be reached, not an audience.
This platform holds no reviewed creative-sector evidence for this country. Reach and payment access are stand-ins for a sector nobody has measured here.
Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025
A trader using regional markets
Trade was 138% of GDP in 2025, so what happens at a neighbour's border arrives as a domestic price within months. This country sits inside COMESA, AMU/UMA. AfCFTA has been signed by every African Union member state except Eritrea, but tariff schedules, rules of origin and customs practice — not the treaty — decide whether a small consignment moves more cheaply in 2036 than it does today. 33% of people aged 15 and over held a bank or mobile-money account in 2024 — the share able to settle across a border without carrying cash.
Better if
Rules of origin are agreed on contested product lines and applied at national customs, not just gazetted.
Worse if
Regional blocs fragment further, or preferential tariffs remain unimplemented at the border despite ratification.
Who this misses
Small cross-border traders, disproportionately women, who operate below the threshold at which formal preferential regimes are usable at all.
Assumptions and evidence
Trade openness is a national accounts ratio and says nothing about the cost or time of a specific border crossing.
This platform holds no country-level data on intra-African trade share, non-tariff barriers or border clearance times — the measures that would matter most here.
Trade (exports + imports) 137.7% · 2025Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024
A family in a growing city
Urban population was growing 1.1% a year in 2025, doubling roughly every 65 years. On the projected population, of the order of 718,793 additional people are living in this country's towns and cities by 2036. 17% of urban residents were in informal settlements in 2022 — housing built faster than it was serviced. Under Disruption, 79% of the population has electricity by 2036. The decisions that determine whether this family's commute is one hour or three — where roads, water mains and drainage go, and which land is reserved before it is built on — are being made now, and are expensive to reverse afterwards.
Better if
Land for roads, water mains and drainage is bought and reserved before settlement arrives — the cheapest infrastructure decision available and the one most often skipped.
Worse if
Growth outpaces servicing, in which case today's new neighbourhoods become the next decade's retrofit problem at many times the cost.
Who this misses
Renters and residents without secure tenure, who bear eviction risk and are usually the first displaced when upgrading finally arrives.
Assumptions and evidence
Urban share is held constant when estimating additional urban residents; in practice it is rising, so this is a conservative figure.
This platform holds no city-level data. National averages conceal very large differences between a capital and a secondary town.
Urban population 87.9% · 2025Urban population growth 1.1% · 2025Population living in slums 16.6% · 2022
A citizen dealing with government
Government effectiveness scored -1.4 in 2024 on a scale running roughly −2.5 to +2.5. With 93% internet use by 2036 under Disruption, permits, payments, registrations and records can plausibly be handled without a physical queue for that share of the population — the most tangible improvement most citizens would actually notice. Voice and accountability scored -1.3 (2024). The same identity systems, registries and monitoring capability that shorten a queue are also what surveillance is built from, and the measures that would constrain misuse currently score in the lower band. Both outcomes are live and depend on choices not yet made.
Better if
Digital public infrastructure is built with data protection law, independent oversight and offline fallbacks from the start.
Worse if
Identity and payment systems become a precondition for services before coverage is universal, excluding people from entitlements they already hold.
Who this misses
People without formal identity documents, who are disproportionately rural, poor, migrant or stateless — and who are excluded twice when services move online.
Assumptions and evidence
Governance indicators are perception-based composites. They signal direction and relative position, not measured administrative performance.
Connectivity is assumed to be usable for government services; in practice affordability, literacy and identity documentation each gate access again.
Government effectiveness -1.42 · 2024Voice and accountability -1.34 · 2024
A member of the diaspora weighing return or investment
Remittances were 0% of GDP in 2006, against foreign direct investment at 1.8% — meaning money sent home by citizens abroad is a significant and unusually reliable external flow. Under Disruption, real output per person moves from $6,449 (2025) to $3,265 by 2036, about -6% a year. By 2036, 79% electricity access and 93% internet use set what can actually be operated on the ground. Rule of law scored -1.7 (2024), which is the measure that most often decides whether a diaspora investor commits capital rather than only sending support.
Better if
Property registration, repatriation of profits and dispute resolution are made predictable — the three things that convert diaspora sentiment into diaspora capital.
Worse if
Currency controls or an unpredictable tax treatment of returning residents make commitment more expensive than continued remittance.
Who this misses
Diaspora members without capital to invest, whose contribution is already the largest single external flow and who are rarely the audience for investment policy.
Assumptions and evidence
GDP per capita paths are in constant present-day dollars and assume no exchange-rate or price forecast.
Remittance ratios are balance-of-payments estimates and exclude informal channels, which are substantial in most of these countries.
Personal remittances received 0% · 2006Foreign direct investment, net inflows 1.8% · 2023GDP per capita $6,449 · 2025Rule of law -1.7 · 2024
Structural forces the growth model cannot see
The quantitative band on this page extrapolates fifteen years of this country's own growth. It is
defensible because it is narrow — and what it cannot see is anything those fifteen years did not
contain. These are those things, assessed from evidence and deliberately not converted into numbers.
Political instability & conflict
Binding constraint
Political stability scored -1.9 in 2024, in the lowest band of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, with 85,000 people internally displaced (2025). The distance between scenarios here is set by whether the security situation holds, not by economic policy. The modelled band, drawn from recent economic history, does not describe what further deterioration would mean.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Conflict does not appear in a trailing growth average until after it has already happened. A country at peace for fifteen years has no war in its variance.
Political stability and absence of violence -1.9 · 2024Internally displaced people 85,000 · 2025Refugees originating from this country (UNHCR mandate) 17,161 · 2025
Commodity dependence
Binding constraint
Natural resource rents were 61% of GDP in 2021. At this concentration the budget — and therefore public salaries and services — tracks prices set on other continents. The scenario question is not whether the resources exist but whether any value is captured, processed and taxed before they leave.
Why the growth model cannot see this
The growth band averages across a commodity cycle, which flatters producers in a downswing and understates their exposure in an upswing. Price is set elsewhere and transmits to the budget within a quarter.
Total natural resources rents 61% · 2021Exports of goods and services 71.7% · 2025
Institutional capacity & regulatory reform
Binding constraint
Government effectiveness scored -1.4 in 2024, regulatory quality -1.7. On these perception-based measures, delivery capacity is the constraint that binds the others: the plans may be sound and still not arrive.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Implementation capacity is what separates an announced plan from a delivered one. It is the single largest reason infrastructure pipelines across this continent under-deliver, and it is invisible in output data.
Government effectiveness -1.42 · 2024Regulatory quality -1.74 · 2024Rule of law -1.7 · 2024
Climate exposure & disaster risk
Material
Water withdrawals are 817% of available resources (2022). 10% of workers are in agriculture (2025). Exposure is significant enough that a severe season would show up in national accounts.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Climate impact is non-linear and arrives as discrete events. A decade of trailing growth contains the droughts that happened, not the ones now becoming more likely.
Freshwater withdrawal as share of available resources 817.1% · 2022Employment in agriculture 10% · 2025New displacement associated with disasters 53,000 · 2023Prevalence of undernourishment 16.5% · 2023
Food & water systems
Material
Undernourishment affected 16.5% of the population in 2023, with food 22% of merchandise imports (2019).
Why the growth model cannot see this
Food security is a function of income and logistics as much as of harvests. Food usually exists in the region and cannot affordably be moved — a distribution failure that output data does not describe.
Electricity is a precondition, not an output. A growth average cannot express that a factory, clinic or data centre simply cannot be operated at all.
Access to electricity 77.4% · 2024Access to electricity, rural 0.8% · 2012
Population pressure & the youth cohort
Watch
Population is projected to rise 10.8% by 2036.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Per-capita growth already nets out population, which hides the absolute scale of what must be built. A constant GDP per capita with a doubling population means twice the schools for the same living standard.
Population aged 0–14 26.8% · 2025
Urbanisation
Watch
Urban growth was 1.1% in 2025.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Where people live determines what infrastructure is worth building. The decisions being made now about land, water mains and drainage are expensive to reverse and invisible in GDP.
Urban population growth 1.1% · 2025Urban population 87.9% · 2025Population living in slums 16.6% · 2022
Regional integration
Watch
Member of 2 regional bodies; trade is 138% of GDP (2025).
Why the growth model cannot see this
Market access changes the ceiling on what is worth producing. A trailing average is drawn from the market a country had, not the one a treaty may give it — or take away.
Trade (exports + imports) 137.7% · 2025
Major infrastructure completion
Watch
0 reviewed projects have been announced or approved but have no verified financing. Announcements are cheap in this domain — treat them as intent, not capacity.
Why the growth model cannot see this
A dam, port or corridor that has never existed contributes nothing to a trailing mean, then changes the economics of a whole region the year it is commissioned.
AI, automation & compute ownership
Watch
Africa holds about 0.6% of global data centre capacity, almost all of it in five other countries. For this country the practical questions are about terms rather than facilities: where public data sits, under whose jurisdiction, and whether any value from data generated here is captured here.
Why the growth model cannot see this
The economic value of AI accrues to whoever owns the compute, the models and the data. A national growth figure records output, not who captured it or where it was booked.
Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024Access to electricity 77.4% · 2024
External & geopolitical influence
Watch
FDI was 1.8% of GDP, remittances 0%.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Financing terms, security partnerships and market access are set in other capitals. They change faster than a fifteen-year average can register, and they change most sharply for the countries with least leverage.
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 1.8% · 2023Personal remittances received 0% · 2006
Education & workforce capability
Supportive
Gross tertiary enrolment was 58.5% in 2003 — a genuine strategic asset, provided the graduates find work that uses the training.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Human capital compounds on a decade lag. The tertiary enrolment rate today sets the ceiling on what the state can regulate and what firms can build in 2036, and no growth average encodes that.
Under-five mortality was 9.8 per 1,000 in 2024 — evidence that basic public systems function, which is not something a single project can produce.
Why the growth model cannot see this
A health shock removes labour and imposes costs simultaneously. Systems that were already thin absorb nothing, and the growth record of a decade without a pandemic says nothing about the next one.
Physicians per 1,000 people 2.04 / 1,000 · 2017Out-of-pocket health expenditure 19.2% · 2023Under-5 mortality rate 9.8 / 1,000 · 2024
Digital infrastructure
Supportive
82% of people used the internet in 2024, with 33% account ownership (2024). Connectivity at this level makes digitally delivered public services genuinely reachable rather than aspirational.
Why the growth model cannot see this
Connectivity is a platform for other sectors rather than a sector itself. Its absence caps what health, education, finance and government can each become, in ways no aggregate growth figure separates out.
Individuals using the internet 82% · 2024Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+ 33.1% · 2024Fixed broadband subscriptions 4.5 / 100 · 2022
1 further forces assessed as not evident or unknown
Sovereign debt & fiscal distress
Unknown
Neither central government debt nor revenue is reported for this country — a significant gap, and a common one.
Why the growth model cannot see this
A default is a discontinuity. Trailing variance cannot contain an event that has not yet occurred, and debt service crowds out the spending that produces future growth long before any default.
What would invalidate the modelled band
Political instability & conflict. Onset or escalation of armed conflict. The modelled band is drawn from economic history and contains no war; if this occurs, disregard the quantitative path entirely.
Commodity dependence. A sustained move in the country's principal export price of more than roughly a third. The band averages across a cycle and understates both tails.
Institutional capacity & regulatory reform. A change of government that materially alters delivery capacity, in either direction.
Climate exposure & disaster risk. A multi-season drought or a major flood event affecting the main producing regions. Discrete climate events are outside any band built from recent averages.
Food & water systems. A regional harvest failure, or a change in the affordability of food imports.
Research depth and transparency
Initial country reviewLast reviewed 2026-07-25
Some country-specific evidence reviewed, but narrow — fewer than three of the five target areas covered.
Reviewed items
1
Categories covered
1 of 24
Target areas covered
2 of 5
Primary or official sources
0
Secondary or tertiary sources
1
Verified items
0
Unverified items
1
Oldest source
2025-10
Newest source
2025-10
Target areas not yet covered: Macroeconomic & fiscal, Human development, Technology & AI.
Why research stops here. Libya has competing administrations. Fiscal, infrastructure and human-development evidence could not be sourced to a single authoritative national institution, and this platform does not choose between contested authorities.
Reviewed country evidence
1 item across 1 category,
reviewed 2026-07-25. Every item carries a publisher, a date, a link and a delivery status.
An announcement is not an asset — status is the field that matters most here.
Libya's output has recovered to a twelve-year high. Who controls the resulting revenue remains contested, and that question governs the outlook more than the production figure does.
Partially operational1
Energy generation & transmission
Partially operationalAlready in effectunverifiedsecondaryVerified delivery
Libya's oil output reached about 1.49 million barrels per day, its highest level since 2013, with the National Oil Corporation targeting 1.6 million barrels per day by the end of 2026.
Scenario implication. Output recovery restores fiscal capacity but does not resolve the contested control of that revenue, which is the variable this platform cannot model.
Production recovery is reported by specialist regional media. Not verified against a National Oil Corporation primary publication.
No creative-economy evidence reviewed for this country.
That is a statement about this platform's reading, not about the country. Creative activity is
poorly captured by official statistics almost everywhere on the continent: it is largely informal,
it straddles national-accounts categories, and few African statistics agencies publish a creative
satellite account. Absence here should be read as an unmeasured sector, never as an empty one.
Readings
The platform's own interpretation of the evidence, set in serif and marked so it never reads as
measurement. Each cites the values it fired on.
DriverInterpretation
Population is projected to rise from 7.5 million in 2026 to 8.4 million by 2036 — an additional 817,635 people, 10.8% more than today. This is the most fixed variable in every scenario on this page: the people who will be adults in 2036 have already been born. What is genuinely uncertain is not how many there will be, but what they will have to work with.
Population (estimates & projections) 7539851 · 2026
DriverInterpretation
Fertility was 2.3 births per woman in 2024, with 68% of the population of working age. This country is further through its demographic transition than most of the continent: the window in which a large working-age share can be converted into savings, investment and productivity is open now, and it does not stay open indefinitely.
Youth unemployment stood at 50.1% in 2025, against 18.8% overall on ILO modelled estimates. Measured unemployment understates the problem in economies where most work is informal — the sharper question is not whether young people are working but whether the work pays, accumulates skill, or leads anywhere.
33% of women aged 15 and over were in the labour force in 2025 — a participation rate, not women’s share of the workforce. Closing participation gaps is among the few available levers that raises output without requiring new capital, new energy capacity or external financing — it requires childcare, safety, transport and legal capacity to hold assets.
Female labour force participation rate, 15+ 32.995 · 2025
RiskInterpretation
Natural resource rents were 61% of GDP in 2021. Revenue at this concentration ties the budget — and therefore schools, clinics and salaries — to prices set on other continents. The scenario question is not whether the resources exist but whether any of the value is captured, processed and taxed domestically before it leaves.
Total natural resources rents 61.035 · 2021
OpportunityInterpretation
82% of people used the internet in 2024. Connectivity at this level makes digitally-delivered services — payments, health advice, agricultural extension, public administration — genuinely reachable rather than aspirational, and shifts the constraint to trust, cost and content.
Individuals using the internet 81.954 · 2024
RiskInterpretation
Undernourishment affected 16.5% of the population in 2023 — on current population, in the order of 1.2 million people. Food security here is a function of income and logistics at least as much as of harvests: food usually exists somewhere in the region, and cannot affordably be moved to where it is needed.
Prevalence of undernourishment 16.5 · 2023
DriverInterpretation
Trade was 138% of GDP in 2025. An economy this open transmits external shocks quickly — freight rates, tariffs and a neighbour's border policy arrive as domestic prices within months.
Trade (exports + imports) 137.659 · 2025
RiskInterpretation
Domestic credit to the private sector was 12.5% of GDP in 2025. That is a stock ratio for the whole economy: it does not separate lending to large firms from lending to small ones, and it cannot show which firms sought credit or were refused. What it does establish is how little total credit the private sector holds relative to output, which bounds how much of any expansion can be debt-financed.
Domestic credit to private sector 12.536 · 2025
DriverInterpretation
Government effectiveness scored -1.4 in 2024 on the Worldwide Governance Indicators scale (roughly −2.5 to +2.5), well below the global mid-point, with regulatory quality at -1.7. These are perception-based composite measures and should be read as a signal about implementation capacity rather than as a verdict — but implementation capacity is precisely what separates an announced plan from a delivered one.
Government effectiveness -1.419 · 2024Regulatory quality -1.739 · 2024
RiskInterpretation
Political stability and absence of violence scored -1.9 in 2024, in the lowest band of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. At this level, the distance between scenarios is set less by economic policy than by whether the security situation holds. The disruption band on this page is drawn from recent economic history, and it does not capture what a further deterioration would mean.
Political stability and absence of violence -1.896 · 2024
RiskInterpretation
Freshwater withdrawals were 817% of available renewable resources in 2022. Above 40% is conventionally treated as high water stress: agriculture, cities, industry and power generation are already competing for the same water, and that competition is what turns a dry year into a political event.
Freshwater withdrawal as share of available resources 817.143 · 2022
DriverInterpretation
The country hosted 552,523 refugees as at 2025. Hosting on this scale is usually carried by the poorest border regions rather than by capitals, and rarely appears in the national economic narrative despite being one of its real features.
Refugees hosted (UNHCR mandate, by country of asylum) 552523 · 2025
Who this lands on
Likely to gain
Women entering paid work, and the households whose income rises with them
The public finances, when prices are high
Small firms and independent workers able to reach customers beyond their street
At risk of being left behind
Educated young people whose qualifications do not convert into work
Everyone dependent on public salaries and services when prices fall
Households already spending most of their income on food
Firms whose expansion depends on credit, in an economy holding little of it relative to output
Civilians in contested areas, for whom no economic scenario on this page is the operative question
Irrigating farmers and cities drawing on the same stressed sources
Decisions available now
Childcare, safe transport and legal capacity to own and register assets — the three constraints that show up in the data most consistently.
Bank the windfalls in a rules-based fund and publish the balance. The commodity cycle is the one thing about which every producer has perfect foresight and imperfect discipline.
Fix collateral registries, insolvency procedure and payment rails before subsidising credit. Cheap credit into a broken enforcement system creates bad loans, not businesses.
Security first, in the plain sense: no economic scenario on this page survives contact with sustained violence.
Price and allocate water between agriculture, cities and power explicitly, before a drought does it implicitly.
Artificial intelligence — one layer, not the whole story
FoundationsInterpretation
With 82% internet use (2024) and 77% electricity access (2024), AI-mediated services can reach a substantial minority — largely urban, largely younger, largely already connected. Deployments built on these foundations will tend to widen the gap with everyone else unless they are explicitly designed not to.
Individuals using the internet 81.954 · 2024Access to electricity 77.4 · 2024
Work and productivityInterpretation
With 71% of employment in services (2025), a meaningful share of jobs involve exactly the tasks language models perform cheaply — drafting, summarising, first-line support, routine analysis. That cuts both ways: outsourced and business-process work is genuinely exposed, while the same tools raise the output of small firms that could never afford specialist staff.
Employment in agriculture 9.997 · 2025Employment in services 71.375 · 2025
Compute and ownershipInterpretation
Africa holds about 0.6% of global data centre capacity, and almost all of it sits in South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria. For this country, the practical questions in this decade are therefore about terms rather than facilities: where public data is hosted and under whose jurisdiction, what a government pays for inference, whether procurement requires local language performance, and whether any value from data generated here is captured here.
Language and inclusionInterpretation
Systems that only work in a former colonial language, in text, for confident readers, will reach the people who already had access to services. Voice interfaces and genuinely capable local-language models are the difference between AI as a broadening technology and AI as another sorting mechanism — and that capability depends on datasets that mostly do not exist yet, which is itself an opportunity for whoever builds them.
Government and civil libertiesInterpretation
Government effectiveness scored -1.4 (2024) and voice and accountability -1.3 on the Worldwide Governance Indicators. AI in public administration can compress waiting times for permits, payments and records — the most tangible improvement most citizens would notice. The same infrastructure — identity systems, biometric registries, communications monitoring — is also what surveillance is built from, and the accountability measures that would constrain its misuse currently score in the lower band. Both possibilities are live and depend on choices not yet made.
Government effectiveness -1.419 · 2024Voice and accountability -1.336 · 2024
Information integrityInterpretation
With 82% of people online (2024), synthetic audio and video are cheap enough to matter in elections, communal disputes and markets. Detection is not a solved problem anywhere, and it is hardest for exactly the languages and dialects with the least training data — which describes most of the continent's information environment.
Individuals using the internet 81.954 · 2024
The twenty-dimension profile
20 dimensions. 5 rest on a document or a
measurement, 4 are inferred from adjacent
indicators, 7 were searched without
result, and 4 have not been examined at all.
That last number is a statement about this platform, not about Libya — and keeping the
two apart is why there is no score here.
Can this country power a data centre without taking supply from households?
1 energy document reviewed alongside household access of 77.4% (2024) and rural access of 0.8%. Generation plans exist; whether new load is additional or displacing is not established.
Why it matters. Compute is a load before it is an industry. A country adding megawatts of IT load onto a grid that already fails is choosing between two customers, and the choice is political, not technical.
What would change this. A grid operator statement, a power-purchase agreement for a named facility, or a published reserve-margin figure.
MeasuredConnectivity foundation
How much of the population can reach a network at all?
82.0% of the population used the internet in 2024, with 193 mobile subscriptions per 100 people and 4.5 fixed broadband subscriptions per 100.
Why it matters. Every AI application that reaches a person reaches them over a connection. The connectivity number sets the ceiling on adoption regardless of what is built.
What would change this. Nothing — this dimension is measured. It ages rather than changes state.
Not evidentData-centre capacity
Is there compute inside this country, or only compute it rents elsewhere?
No data-centre document found for this country. Africa holds well under 1% of global capacity and it is concentrated in a handful of markets, so absence here is the expected case rather than a surprising one.
Why it matters. Where the compute sits determines who sets the terms, where the jobs are, and whose law applies to the data. It is the difference between a market and a customer.
What would change this. An operator announcement with a named site, a commissioning notice, or an installed-IT-load figure.
Not evidentInternational bandwidth
How does traffic leave the country, and how many ways are there out?
No verified cable landing recorded for this coastal country in the systems layer.
Why it matters. A landlocked country, or a coastal one served by a single cable, pays more for bandwidth and loses it entirely when the cable breaks. Route diversity is a resilience property, not a luxury.
What would change this. A cable consortium landing announcement, or an IXP traffic figure showing how much traffic stays domestic.
Governance
Not evidentNational AI policy or strategy
Has the state written down what it intends to do about AI?
No national AI policy or strategy document found for this country. Roughly a third of African states have adopted one, so absence is common and not disqualifying.
Why it matters. A strategy is not capability. But its absence means every decision about compute, data and procurement is being taken case by case, usually by whoever arrives with a proposal.
What would change this. A published national strategy, a cabinet approval, or an AU-level commitment with a national instrument behind it.
UnexaminedData protection and privacy law
Is there a law governing what may be done with data about people here?
This platform has not yet reviewed data-protection legislation for this country. The African Union Malabo Convention and a substantial number of national laws exist; none has been read and cited here. This is a research gap, not a finding.
Why it matters. Training data comes from somewhere. Without an enforceable data-protection regime, the terms on which a country's population becomes training data are set entirely by whoever is collecting.
What would change this. The national data protection act, the establishment of a supervisory authority, or a first enforcement action.
Not evidentGovernment AI adoption
Is the state itself using these systems, and on whom?
No document found on government use of AI systems in this country. Deployments in eligibility, policing and border control are rarely announced, so absence here is weak evidence.
Why it matters. Government is usually the largest single deployer in a low-income economy, and the deployments that matter most — benefits eligibility, policing, border control — are the ones least likely to be evaluated in public.
What would change this. A procurement notice, an audit, a parliamentary answer, or a civil-society investigation.
InferredDigital public infrastructure
Is there national identity, payment and data-exchange infrastructure for AI systems to attach to?
No DPI document reviewed. Account ownership of 33.1% of adults (2024) is used as a partial stand-in for payment rails, and stands in for nothing else.
Why it matters. DPI decides whether an AI service can identify a person, be paid, and read a record. It is the rail that determines whether an application reaches anyone.
What would change this. An identity system enrolment figure, an instant-payment system launch, or a data-exchange layer going live.
Capability
UnexaminedResearch capacity
Does the country fund people to work on this?
No R&D spending series for this country. Coverage of this indicator is thin across the continent, which is itself informative about statistical capacity.
Why it matters. Capability compounds and cannot be imported at short notice. R&D spending in 2026 sets what is possible domestically in 2036, not in 2028.
What would change this. A national R&D survey, or a named research institute with published funding.
InferredSkills and tertiary education
How many people are being educated to the level this work requires?
Tertiary gross enrolment was 58.5% in 2003. No education-sector document has been reviewed, and enrolment says nothing about field of study — the technical share is not captured here.
Why it matters. Tertiary enrolment today is the technical workforce of 2036. It is one of the few variables on this platform whose effect on the far horizon is close to arithmetic.
What would change this. Graduate numbers by field, or a national skills programme with enrolment figures.
Not evidentStartup and venture ecosystem
Is there private capital forming around this domestically?
No startup or investment-ecosystem document found. Continental venture funding is concentrated in four markets, so absence is the majority case.
Why it matters. Where the capital comes from decides where the equity ends up. An ecosystem funded entirely offshore builds capability locally and captures returns elsewhere.
What would change this. A funding total from a named tracker, a domestic venture fund launch, or a public co-investment vehicle.
UnexaminedLocal-language technology
Do these systems work in the languages people here actually speak?
This platform has not reviewed local-language technology evidence for this country. A language appearing on a vendor's supported-languages list is marketing, not a measurement, and is not accepted here as evidence of capability. Benchmarked performance is what would count.
Why it matters. A model that performs well in English and badly in the working language of a market excludes most of that market from anything built on it — and does so invisibly, because the failure looks like a user problem.
What would change this. A published benchmark on a named language, a corpus release, or an evaluation by a local research group.
MeasuredData about the country itself
Does the data needed to build anything useful here exist?
This country has values for 92% of the indicator series carried on this platform. Thin coverage is concentrated in the countries with the weakest statistical systems, so it compounds: the places hardest to model are the places least modelled.
Why it matters. Models are built on records. A country whose own statistical system is thin cannot be modelled well by anyone, including by itself, and thin coverage is not randomly distributed.
What would change this. A census, a household survey release, or a national statistics office publishing an open data portal.
Consequence
MeasuredWork and exposure
What kind of work does the economy actually consist of?
10.0% of employment was in agriculture (2025); 71.4% in services (2025). Youth unemployment was 50.1%. Exposure to automation follows this composition, and no country-specific study of it has been reviewed here.
Why it matters. The automation debate imported from high-income countries assumes an office-heavy workforce. Where most employment is agricultural or informal, the near-term exposure is different in kind, not just in degree.
What would change this. A national labour-force survey with occupational detail, or a country-specific exposure study.
Not evidentApplication: agriculture
Is anything being applied to the sector most people work in?
No agricultural-technology document found, in an economy where 10.0% of employment is agricultural (2025). The gap between where the workforce is and where the documented activity is, is the finding.
Why it matters. Advisory, weather and pest-detection systems are the applications with the widest possible reach in most of these economies, and the ones least represented in the funding.
What would change this. An extension programme with enrolment figures, or an evaluation of an advisory service.
InferredApplication: health systems
Is any of this reaching clinical care or health financing?
2.04 physicians per 1,000 people (2017). No health-system document reviewed; clinician scarcity is recorded as context, not as evidence of any deployment.
Why it matters. Diagnostic support matters most where clinicians are scarcest, which is exactly where the infrastructure to run it is thinnest. The two constraints are inversely correlated.
What would change this. A ministry deployment, a regulatory approval for a diagnostic device, or a published clinical evaluation.
Not evidentApplication: creative production
What do generative tools do to the sectors that make things people watch, wear and hear?
No creative-economy document found for this country, so no basis exists for saying anything about AI's effect on its creative sector.
Why it matters. Screen and music production are among the most directly exposed activities anywhere, and in several of these economies they are among the fastest-growing measured sectors. Nobody has published what happens when the two meet.
What would change this. A sector survey, a union or guild position with membership data, or a rights-body statement on training data.
InferredInformation integrity
How exposed is public life here to synthetic media?
Voice and accountability at -1.34 (2024). No document on information integrity or platform governance has been reviewed for this country; this is inference from a governance indicator, which is a weak basis.
Why it matters. Synthetic audio and video are cheapest to produce and hardest to verify exactly where fact-checking capacity is thinnest and elections are closest.
What would change this. An electoral commission position on synthetic media, a platform transparency report covering the country, or a documented incident.
UnexaminedCompute ownership and value capture
If compute is built here, who owns it and where do the returns go?
No compute document, so no ownership question arises yet.
Why it matters. A data centre built, owned and operated by a foreign firm, serving foreign customers, on subsidised local power, is an export of electricity dressed as an investment. Whether that is what is happening is an ownership question, not a capacity question.
What would change this. A shareholding disclosure, a tariff or tax-incentive instrument, or a power-purchase agreement made public.
DocumentedRegional and continental position
Does anything about this country's AI position depend on its neighbours?
Member of 2 regional blocs recorded in the continental systems layer, with no trade document reviewed. Digital-trade provisions specifically have not been reviewed for this country.
Why it matters. Bandwidth transits borders, power pools cross them, and AfCFTA governs whether a service sold in one market can be sold in the next. None of this is decided nationally.
What would change this. The AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol's ratification status for this country, or a regional data-flow agreement.
Current position
Every measure the platform holds for Libya, with the year of observation. Gaps are shown as gaps.
Economy & growth
Measure
Value
Year
GDP per capita
$6,449
2025
GDP
$48.1bn
2025
GDP growth, annual
13.4%
2025
Inflation, consumer prices
1.8%
2025
Manufacturing value added
2.8%
2017
Government revenue excl. grants
not available
Central government debt
not available
Population & demography
Measure
Value
Year
Population
7.5m
2025
Population growth, annual
1%
2025
Population aged 0–14
26.8%
2025
Population aged 15–64
68%
2025
Fertility rate, total
2.3
2024
Life expectancy at birth
71.1 yrs
2024
Cities & urbanisation
Measure
Value
Year
Urban population
87.9%
2025
Urban population growth
1.1%
2025
Urban population, total
6.6m
2025
Population living in slums
16.6%
2022
Work, skills & youth
Measure
Value
Year
Unemployment, total (ILO modelled)
18.8%
2025
Youth unemployment, 15–24 (ILO modelled)
50.1%
2025
Employment in agriculture
10%
2025
Employment in services
71.4%
2025
Female labour force participation rate, 15+
33%
2025
School enrolment, secondary (gross)
97.6%
2006
School enrolment, tertiary (gross)
58.5%
2003
Government expenditure on education
2.3%
1999
Adult literacy rate
not available
Health & public services
Measure
Value
Year
Current health expenditure
7.8%
2023
Out-of-pocket health expenditure
19.2%
2023
Under-5 mortality rate
9.8 / 1,000
2024
Maternal mortality ratio
59 / 100k
2023
Physicians per 1,000 people
2.04 / 1,000
2017
Safely managed drinking water
not available
Agriculture & food systems
Measure
Value
Year
Agriculture, forestry & fishing value added
1.5%
2025
Cereal yield
660 kg/ha
2024
Prevalence of undernourishment
16.5%
2023
Food imports
21.6%
2019
Arable land
1%
2023
Energy & resources
Measure
Value
Year
Access to electricity
77.4%
2024
Access to electricity, rural
0.8%
2012
Renewable energy consumption
3.1%
2021
Total natural resources rents
61%
2021
Access to clean cooking fuels
not available
Digital & AI foundations
Measure
Value
Year
Individuals using the internet
82%
2024
Mobile cellular subscriptions
193 / 100
2022
Fixed broadband subscriptions
4.5 / 100
2022
Account at a bank or mobile-money provider, age 15+
33.1%
2024
High-technology exports
0.6%
2019
Research & development expenditure
not available
Trade, investment & enterprise
Measure
Value
Year
Trade (exports + imports)
137.7%
2025
Exports of goods and services
71.7%
2025
Foreign direct investment, net inflows
1.8%
2023
Personal remittances received
0%
2006
Domestic credit to private sector
12.5%
2025
Governance & institutions
Measure
Value
Year
Government effectiveness
-1.42
2024
Regulatory quality
-1.74
2024
Rule of law
-1.7
2024
Control of corruption
-1.53
2024
Voice and accountability
-1.34
2024
Political stability and absence of violence
-1.9
2024
Climate & environment
Measure
Value
Year
CO₂ emissions per capita
8.66 t
2024
Forest area
0.1%
2023
Freshwater withdrawal as share of available resources
817.1%
2022
Agricultural land
8.7%
2023
Security, migration & displacement
Measure
Value
Year
Net migration
-172
2025
Refugees hosted (UNHCR mandate, by country of asylum)
552,523
2025
Refugees originating from this country (UNHCR mandate)
17,161
2025
Internally displaced people
85,000
2025
Military expenditure
5.3%
2023
What we do not know
6 of 74 tracked measures have no value for Libya. They are never estimated.
Central government debtGovernment revenue excl. grantsAdult literacy rateSafely managed drinking waterAccess to clean cooking fuelsResearch & development expenditure
Sources
Every value above comes from one of these series, republished by the World Bank Indicators API from the primary compilations named.